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VIEWS FROM THE BENCH: THE JUDICIARY AND
CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS. By M. Cannon1 and D.
O'Brien. 2 Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House Publishers, Inc.
1985. Pp. xxii, 330. Cloth, $25.00; paper, $12.95.
Alan D. Hornstein 3
The celebrated advocate John W. Davis, addressing a group of
lawyers on the topic of appellate advocacy, compared himself to a
fisherman, the judges being the fish. 4 This book is a collection of
fish stories. What makes it a bit unusual is that it is written by the
fish. Cannon and O'Brien have put together an interesting and informative collection of essays written by judges of various courts,
including several essays by present Justices of the United States
Supreme Court,s past Justices,6 as well as an essay by one who
should have been a Justice,7 one mentioned prominently for that
position,s and one who perhaps should be.9
The book is divided into six parts, with an introduction to each
by the editors. Part I includes two essays that set the historical and
political contexts in which the courts operate. The subject of Part
II, which I shall explore in greater detail below, is the process of
judicial decisionmaking and opinion writing. It is by far the
lengthiest and most interesting section of the book, comprising eight
essays.w
The familiar questions of the appropriate level of judicial activism or restraint are the subject of Part III, "The Judiciary and the
Constitution," and Part VI, "The Judicial Role in a Litigious Society." Much of Part IV, "The Judiciary and Federal Regulation:
I. Administrative Assistant to the Chief Justice of the United States.
2. Associate Professor, Woodrow Wilson Department of Government and Foreign Affairs, University of Virginia.
3. Associate Professor of Law, University of Maryland. I would like to thank
Kenneth Cobleigh for his excellent research assistance and my colleague, William L.
Reynolds, for his helpful comments.
4. Davis, The Argument of an Appeal, 26 A.B.A. J. 895, 895 (1940).
5. In addition to Chief Justices Burger and Rehnquist, Justices O'Connor, Stevens,
Brennan, Powell, and Scalia are represented.
6. Pieces by Justices Black, Jackson, Frankfurter, and the second Justice Harlan are
included.
7. Friendly, The Courts and Social Policy: Substance and Procedure.
8. Bork, Tradition and Morality in Constitutional Law.
9. Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States' Bills of Rights, in id. at 237.
10. There is also a concluding one on judicial administration, using the office of Chief
Justice under Warren Burger as a model. Although this last essay has little in common with
the others in this section, it is interesting on its own terms, especially as a new Chief is about
to take the con.
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Line Drawing and Statutory Construction," deals with similar issues in the context of separation of powers. These parts of the book
differ more in title than in substance; the major difference between
them is that one addresses the question from a constitutional perspective-so that the problem is framed as one of interpretivism
versus noninterpretivism as much as in terms of activism versus restraint, another speaks to the judicial role vis-a-vis the legislative
branch, and the third speaks a bit more broadly to the judicial role
in the absence of any authoritative text.
With the one exception of Justice Scalia's contribution, these
sections are perhaps the weakest in the book-not because the issues lack interest or are poorly presented, but because of what is left
out and the familiarity of what is included. As might be expected,
for example, Justice Rehnquist challenges judicial activism as antidemocratic and hence inconsistent with the basic structure of
American governance. Other contributors take a somewhat more
activist view. There is nothing startlingly new. What is perhaps
worse, much is left out. Of course, the reader ought not expect fully
worked out theories of judicial power in essays whose average
length is fewer than ten pages. Indeed, such brief excerpts cannot
do justice either to the original works or to the complexity of the
issues. For example, the selection from Judge Coffin's 273-page
book on appellate judging11 amounts to a mere seven pages, hardly
enough to convey even a flavor of the original. Justice Scalia's essay, by contrast, is only slightly reduced from the original source.12
It is exceptional in this collection for other reasons as well. The
topic is the most technical in the book, and its treatment the most
scholarly, closely reasoned, and analytically sophisticated.
The debate with which these sections of the book are concerned has gone on as long as the Republic. It is here representedwell represented by respected advocates-only in its most traditional terms. Some schools of jurisprudential thought-critical
legal theory and law and economics theory are but two examplesare notably absent. Nevertheless, the positions are clear and understandable, and despite their familiarity, it is a service to have them
gathered in one place. One wishes, however, for a more complete
discussion.
The emphasis on appellate courts reflects a different sort of incompleteness: the book contains only one brief essay concerned
II. F. COFFIN, THE WAYS OF A JUDGE: REFLECTIONS FROM THE FEDERAL APPEL·
LATE BENCH (1980).
12. Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 881 (1983). The editors mis-cite the source of the essay in their
acknowledgements, an irritating error that obviously should not have gone uncorrected.
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with trial court adjudication.'3 Although the editors recognize the
distinction between trial and appellate courts, not enough is made
of the distinction. It should be said, however, that this book is
hardly unique in ignoring this aspect of the judicial system. Yet it is
in the lower courts (and frequently in lawyers' offices) that much of
what we think of as law gets done. It is in the trial courts that most
citizens confront the machinery of law. Failure to recognize the
importance of lower courts stands in the way of much important
progress in understanding and reform of the justice system.I4
Federalism is the subject of Part V, "Our Dual Constitutional
System: The Bill of Rights and the States." Given the title of this
part of the book, it is odd that Justice Black's contribution is not an
elaboration of his well-known view that the fourteenth amendment
incorporates the Bill of Rights. Instead, his essay iterates his literalist view of these constitutional provisions insofar as they limit the
federal government. It is only when we get to the essays by Justice
Brennan and Justice Linde (of the Oregon Supreme Court) that the
nominal subject of this part of the collection is first broached. Both
essays address not only the responsibility of the states in safeguarding the rights provided in the federal Constitution but also their role
in securing rights through their own constitutions. Justice Linde's
hierarchical analysis of the relationship between state and federal
law goes a step beyond Justice Brennan's thesis that state law has a
significant role to play in safeguarding freedom.'s The section concludes with an essay by Justice O'Connor addressing a number of
issues implicating the relationship between the federal and state
courts.
The editors have supplied introductory comments to each part
of the book. These introductions are remarkably tedious reading, if
blessedly brief. Avoiding the exertion of thought, the editors simply
string together long series of quotations. For example, within the
first three sentences, their introduction to Part II quotes from
Holmes, Cardozo, and Irving Kaufman. Similarly, the editors' introduction to Part III contains almost every bromide about the judicial role. Where there is room for dispute the competing cliches are
lined up and quoted-an authority for every cliche and a cliche for
every authority. As Chief Justice Rehnquist points out, however,
the issues are simply too important to be decided by the weight of
cliches or slogans.
13. Frankel, The Adversary Judge: The Experience of the Trial Judge.
14. See Hornstein, Book Review, 44 MD. L. REV. 216, 223-24 (1985).
15. See also Hornstein, Federalism, Judicial Power and the "Arising Under" Jurisdiction
of the Federal Courts: A Hierarchical Analysis, 56 IND. L.J. 563 (1981).
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Because of the weakness of these introductory essays, it is difficult to see the audience for this book.l6 Both the foreword by Chief
Justice Burger and the editors' own preface suggest that the book is
directed at the lay reader. But without editorial help, most lay
readers are unlikely to make sense out of this insufficiently connected, not to say disjointed, collection. For the professional, on
the other hand, the readings are too superficial.
Perhaps the greatest problem with this collection is that judges
are no more qualified to address most of the issues with which the
book is concerned than legal philosophers, political scientists, legal
academicians, and others. At first glance, of course, one might
think that judges have a unique vantage point from which to address the role of the judiciary in the American federal constitutional
system. Yet, upon reflection, there is little to suggest that the judicial experience provides such a perspective for treating these issues,
with one important exception-the task of judging itself.
The best-seller lists teem with how-to books; it seems that there
is an instruction manual for virtually any chore, sport, game, occupation, or other activity in which one might wish to indulge, from
repairing one's automobile to managing a multi-million dollar corporation to (of course) fishing. Yet judges have been remarkably
reticent about how they go about doing their jobs. Although perhaps this is beginning to change, few governmental or political activities are still so shrouded in mystery as the craft of judging.
The beginning and end of the process are of course publicmore public than virtually any other aspect of the political process.
Justices Powell and Rehnquist, among others represented here, take
pains to point out that the judicial process is, in the main, open and
public. Court proceedings themselves are typically public; and no
institution in our society is required to justify its decisions in a more
public way than through the formal account of decision we demand
of the courts. Yet the act, perhaps more precisely the process, of
judging, of formulating and writing the opinion that justifies or explains results, remains hidden.
Interestingly, the mystery seems to be shared by the actors
themselves. By far the longest and most interesting section of this
book is concerned with the craft of judging. What is perhaps most
striking about these essays is the lack of any coherent or systematic
account by the fish themselves of what it's like to swim. Judge
Walter Schaefer put the problem well:
16. These introductions also could have been used to bind together or to fill the gaps
left by the selected essays. In Part III, for example, they could have served to provide some
of the contemporary views otherwise absent from the book.
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(W)e lack the ability to describe what happens. I have tried to analyze my own
reactions to particular cases. When I have tried in retrospect, I have doubted somewhat the result . . . . And, when I have tried to carry on simultaneously the process of decision and of self-analysis, the process of decision has not been natural. I
suspect that what is lacking [are] techniques and tools which are sensitive enough

Judge Coffin's sentiments are similar; even the editors reflect this
view. In short, if there is any consensus to be found here, it is that
the art of judging is done largely by feel or hunch.t7
It is surely true that judicial decisions are not made in any precise, geometric, or formulaic way. Indeed attempts at such an approach not only fail to achieve objectivity or certainty, they tend as
well to distort the normative voice of the law.ts One of the things
we expect of judges is judgment. But that requires wisdom; and
that entails at least two prerequisites: first, that the persons we select to judge be capable of wisdom; and second, that the conditions
of the craft permit them to actualize that capacity. Much has been
written (and recently) about judicial selection, and it is, in any
event, beyond the scope of this review. It is the second problem
that I wish to address here. It seems to me that we have begun to
value cleverness over wisdom-that the facile disposition of troublesome issues seems to be displacing thoughtful maintenance of the
law's integrity.t9 In short, for a number of perfectly understandable
reasons, our law is undergoing a disintegration. Rather than the
seamless web the law was once thought of as resembling, increasingly it looks like a patchwork quilt. The common threads, the cultural cohesiveness of the law, if you will, are under strains that
should make us wary. I do not wish to overstate the problem; but it
seems to me a real and serious one. Its symptoms include the dramatic increase in separate opinions that make it difficult to know
not merely what the law is, but what values are being protected by
the various views of it. The resort to formulaic decisionmaking is
another troublesome symptom, as well as a contributing cause of
the problem.2o
Now, to a considerable extent the problem is inevitable. The
larger society of which the courts are a partial reflection is itself less
cohesive than in the past. As one contributor to this collection puts
it, our modem historical circumstance lacks any common religious
17. Not represented in this collection is Hutcheson who, if not the first, is surely the
most well known declarant of the judicial hunch. See Hutcheson, The Judgment Intuitive:
The Function of the "Hunch" in Judicial Decision, 14 CoRNELL L.Q. 274 (1929).
18. Nagel, The Formulaic Constitution, 84 MICH. L. REV. 165 (1985).
19. Cf R. DWORKIN, LAw's EMPIRE (1986). See generally Farber, The Case Against
Brilliance, 70 MINN. L. REV. 917 (1986).
20. Nagel, supra note 18.
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or moral order. Even if this overstates our current situation, our
culture is surely more fragmented than in the past. The typical college curriculum, for example, displays a long list of apparently unconnected offerings-a smorgasbord of more or less nourishing
individual items, but rarely anything approaching a planned dinner.2t One might expect a more integrated, cohesive fabric in a system with one Supreme Court, thirteen states, and four million
citizens22 than in a system with one Supreme Court, fifty states, and
226 million citizens.23 There are now 652 federal judges,24 compared with 505 authorized judgeships only ten years ago.25 One
obvious result is that collegiality inevitably suffers, and the decline
in collegiality results in a more pluralistic vision.
Not only has the size of courts grown, but there has been a
corresponding increase in the size of supporting staff. In the name
of efficiency, the craft of judging (like much else in our highly complex technological society) has become more impersonal. If the
quality of opinions is more important than their quantity, there is
also a felt necessity to move the docket. At least one contributor to
this collection of essays has noted as well the onset of "a kind of
institutional judging," that relies on support staff to a considerable
extent. This growth in supporting personnel was made necessary
because the number of filings has multiplied enormously as well.
Perhaps even more significant is the increased complexity of the
cases, both factually and doctrinally, sometimes involving
thousands of pages of records and dozens of issues. Despite the
demands of efficiency, the institutionalization of judging has had
some unfortunate consequences.
One difficulty aggravated by the growth of supporting personnel is the further atomization of the law. Judges in the federal system have life tenure, and most state court judges have a relatively
long tenure. The classical justification is judicial independence.
There is, however, another benefit to be derived from extended tenure: continuity, a sense of participation in and commitment to the
judicial enterprise that takes time to develop. Surely it does not
develop overnight. At least at present, there is little of the fossiliza21. SeeM. ADLER, A GUIDEBOOK TO LEARNING: FOR A LIFELONG PURSUIT OF WIS·
(1986).
22. U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF
THE UNITED STATES: COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970 (1975).
23. U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES 5 (106th ed. 1986).
24. THE LAWYER'S ALMANAC 748 (1986).
25. 1983 DIR. Ao. OFFICE U.S. CTS. ANN. REP. 3.
DOM
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tion that can occur without the injection of fresh blood. The danger
is rather the opposite.
One manifestation of this danger is the now ubiquitous law
clerk. Almost every judge has at least one; many have more. The
clerk's role and responsibility is determined almost entirely by her
judge. The judge, of course, bears the ultimate responsibility for
every opinion leaving her chambers, and it is still true that judges
do more of their own work than any comparable group in our
political system. Nevertheless, today's law clerk undertakes much
that in more leisurely times would have been done by the judge.
The problem with this is not so much the lack of accountability; law
clerks are probably under sufficiently close supervision and, like
judges, must justify what they do through reasoned and written discourse. Nor is the problem lack of ability. If the truth be told, a
law clerk may well have more intellectual power than her judge.
Most clerks are at or near the top of their classes at fine law schools.
Unlike judges, they obtain their positions almost entirely on the basis of their legal abilities.
The problem instead is the diminution in cultural continuity.26
By and large, clerks are hired immediately out of law school where
they have been exposed to the fashionable, avant-garde ideas. They
serve for terms of a year or two. Thus there is constant turnover of
bright but inexperienced personnel, many of whom are given significant responsibilities. Without experience in the law-sometimes
with little significant life experience beyond two decades of schooling-these brilliant tyros may yet have significant impact on
doctrinal development. Any single case, even any moderately large
sampling of cases may not exhibit the symptoms. Yet the common
threads, the philosophical coherence of the law suffers. To my
mind much of the indeterminancy to which critical legal theorists
attend is symptomatic of this fragmenting of legal culture.
The heavier demands on judges have other consequences. As
several of the contributors to this collection point out, judging is
often at least in part a matter of hunch or feel. That is one of the
reasons judges must be selected with great care. But time to contemplate, as well as a personality disposed to do so, is essential.
"Why do we not have more great judges like the mighty jurists of
yesteryear? To some degree, perhaps, we are lesser people today.
But perhaps another reason is that, to produce great decisions, a
judge must have time to think, [to] ponder . . . " More than that,
because cases and problems rarely exist in isolation, because law
26. Cf Kissam, The Decline of Law School Professionalism, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 251
(1986) (problem of lack of acculturation in legal academia).
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(life, too) really is a seamless web, judges must understand the
larger cultural context of law.21 All of this is made extremely difficult by the need to move the docket.
Solutions are not easy. Converting law clerk positions to career jobs may help increase continuity but is likely to have unfortunate side effects. The level of ability and intelligence is likely to
suffer significantly. These positions will no longer be sought by the
best and the brightest of law school graduates. Moreover, the new
approaches, the fresh look at problems that new clerks can bring to
a judge's chambers will suffer. Other difficulties are likely to arise if
more experienced lawyers are sought for these positions. It seems
unlikely that those in mid-career will take a year or more to serve as
a law clerk. Moreover, older law clerks might feel less willing to
defer to the judge. (Query whether the arrogance of youth is less a
problem in this regard.)
At the federal level at least, a possible ameliorative might be
expansion of the Judicial Fellowship Program, now devoted primarily to court administration and limited to work with the Supreme
Court, the Federal Judicial Center, and the Administrative Office of
the Courts. Judges with more than one clerk might be invited to
replace one of them with a Fellow, who would serve the chambers
for two or three years. The Fellows-as a practical matter, probably academics-might offer a fuller vision to the judicial branch
while being able to use the experience gained there to enrich the
education of their charges upon a return to the academy. Indeed,
even established professors might welcome a working sabbatical of
service to the courts.2s
Providing opportunities for judges themselves to regain a
deeper understanding of law is also difficult. Fortunately there
seems to be a growing awareness of the importance of cultural heri27. Recall the advice Felix Frankfurter wrote to a youngster who had inquired about
how to prepare himself for a career at the bar:
No one can be a truly competent lawyer unless he is a cultivated man. If I were
you, I would forget all about any technical preparation for the law. The best way to
prepare for the law is to come to the study of the law as a well-read person. Thus
alone can one acquire the capacity to use the English language on paper and in
speech and with the habits of clear thinking which only a truly liberal education can
give. No less important for a lawyer is the cultivation of the imaginative faculties
by reading poetry. seeing great paintings, in the original or in easily available reproductions, and listening to great music. Stock your mind with the deposit of much
good reading, and widen and deepen your feelings by experiencing vicariously as
much as possible the wonderful mysteries of the universe, and forget all about your
future career.
2 THE WORLD OF LAW 725 (E. London ed. 1960).
28. Such a program ought not be costly. First, a Fellow would serve in lieu of one of a
judge's clerks, so no additional salary line would be necessary. Further. at least to the extent
Fellows would be recruited from the academy. competitive salaries need not be exorbitant.
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tage to the life of the law, and some first few steps are being taken.
The Aspen Institute's well-known program for executives is open to
judges. Brandeis University has begun a program for judges in
Massachusetts that plugs them into the cultural tradition through
exploration of certain literary works.29 The ideas underlying that
program have begun to spread. The Judicial Institute of Maryland,
for example, is planning a program on "Judging Through the Looking Glass of Literature"; similar programs are being developed elsewhere. The National Center for State Courts, the National Judicial
College and similar institutions could render much needed encouragement and support to such efforts. A beginning has been made;
much remains to be done.
Another possibility-somewhat more costly, but worth itwould be provision for periodic sabbaticals for judges. Just as
scholars require refreshment without the normal demands of teaching or administration, judges would profit enormously from an extended time for reflection and renewal.
The result of the several pressures on the judicial system is that
judges have less opportunity to develop the wisdom and the ethical
compass they need. The absence of cultural ethos leads ineluctably
to the disintegration of law, and ultimately to the fears expressed by
Roger Cramton in a slightly different context: "a moral relativism
tending toward nihilism, a pragmatism tending toward an amoral
instrumentalism, a realism tending toward cynicism."Jo We must
begin to take steps to reawaken judicial awareness of the cultural
context in which law plays out, so that we might retain-or
regain-our confidence in the cultural and doctrinal integrity of
views from the bench.
29. Garred, Judges Lit, NEW AGE J., Oct. 1984, at 27; Touster, Parables for the Profes·
sions, 5 BRANDEIS REv., Winter 1986, at 2; Touster, ParablesforJudges, B. B. J., Nov. 1983,
at 4.
30. Cramton, The Ordinary Religion of the Law School Classroom, 29 J. LEGAL Eouc.
24 7, 262 (1978).

